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Abstract: Contra claims that depict Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit 
as lacking an ethics of Others, I interpret the very Being of Dasein as 
Mitsein, ontology as ethics. On the basis of this ethical interpretation 
of Heideggerian ontology, I draw out the implications such an 
interpretation has on our ontic, solicitous comportment towards Others. 
I consider vorausspringen, a mode of positive solicitude, as opening 
up the possibility of a certain pedagogical orientation that serves as a 
practical, institutional counterpart to Heidegger’s ontology. I argue that 
this Heideggerian pedagogy is neither individualistic nor autocratic, but 
instead mirrors John Dewey’s “directed freedom.”
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Resumen: Contra la acusación que afirma la ausencia de una ética de 
los otros en Ser y tiempo, de Martin Heidegger, interpreto el verdadero 
ser del Dasein como ser-con (Mitsein) y la ontología como ética. Sobre la 
base de esta interpretación ética de la ontología heideggeriana, extraigo 
las implicaciones que ella tiene sobre nuestro conmportamiento óntico, 
solícito con los otros. Considero el “vorausspringen” un modo de 
solicitud positiva, en cuanto abre la posibilidad de una cierta orientación 
pedagógica que actúa como aliado práctico, institucional, a la ontología 
de Heidegger. Argumento que esta pedagogía heideggeriana no es 
individualista ni autocrática, sino que refleja la “la libertad dirigida” de 
John Dewey.
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The brevity of Martin Heidegger’s explicit treatment of Mitsein (Being-with) and 
of Anderdasein (Other Dasein) in Being and Time has led some commentators 
(Levinas, Löwith, etc.) to call into question the sufficiency of his treatment of 
Others, not only for his own project of fundamental ontology but also for any 
type of ethical practice or praxis (e.g. a working politics, etc.). Although the 
implications of Mitsein and references to Other Daseins are dispersed throughout 
Being and Time, only in §§25-27 does Heidegger take up the topic of Others 
directly. Some have, thus, gone as far as to claim that the discussion of Mitsein has 
no further function than that of a perfunctory addendum, a parenthetical nod to 
Other Dasein that serves as a mere intermission between the “more important” 
discussions of Dasein’s condition of In-der-Welt-sein (Being-in-the-World) and 
Dasein’s Eigentlichkeit (Authenticity), Dasein’s Being-one’s-Self. This will not be 
the contention held here. 
Against this claim, we shall aim to highlight and defend the irreducibly constitutive 
nature of Heidegger’s discussion of (the ontological condition of) Mitsein for 
properly understanding his treatment of Dasein and (its ontological as well as ontic 
relation to) Other Dasein. In so doing, we will be able to unpack the implications 
that the ontological condition of Mitsein has for our solicitude toward Others. And 
on the basis of this solicitude we shall draw out some implications for practical 
action, i.e., for praxis. Of particular interest to us, related to this last aim, will be an 
examination into what relation Mitsein might have to pedagogy and the teacher-
student relationship. A comparison between Heidegger’s account of solicitude 
and John Dewey’s account of pedagogical methodologies shall structure this final 
discussion. It shall be shown here that Dewey offers us a way to put Heidegger’s 
discussion of solicitous comportment toward others into practice. 
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mItSeIN
After having described the existential condition of Dasein as always already Being-
in-the-world, and after defining the very possibility of any such description as 
one that always comes after the fact (since the possibility of ontic description is 
only possible because of the prior ontological condition of already Being-in-the-
world), Heidegger explicitly draws out the ramifications this condition will have on 
the traditional understanding of the subject. On this account, one cannot feasibly 
defend the idea of “a bare subject without a world…. [It] never ‘is’ proximally, 
nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated “I” without Others is just as 
far from being proximally given.”1 The connection being made here is between 
Being-in-the-world, the ontological condition of Dasein’s inseparable, primordial 
immersion in an environment of concern to it, and Other Dasein. Being-in-the-
world, a condition neither surmountable nor voluntary, neither suspendable nor 
transcendable, is a shared condition and there is no sense to be made of speaking 
of Being-in-the-world alone. If there are other ‘entities’ who are also being-there 
(Auch-da-sein), if there are other ‘entities’ who are also there in the world (i.e., 
who are Being-in-the-world) then there are Other Daseins, and these ‘entities’ 
that count as Other Dasein are not entities at all – if by this we mean the present-
at-hand or ready-to-hand – as is the case with those Things (Dinge) in Dasein’s 
workworld. 
 “Co-determined” as she is by Being-in-the-world(-with-Others),2 Dasein, for the 
most part, only notices the existence of Others (and thereby her own proximal 
relation to Others) through what is closest to it, its “workworld” of equipment 
(i.e., the world of Things, the tools for the projects of Dasein’s concern). This is 
to say that Dasein notices Others as those who stand behind each material (non-
Dasein) Thing; as Heidegger’s own example has it, we notice the farmer behind 
the field we approach, even in his absence.3 This proximal noticing is an existential 
discovery of Others rather than a categorical addition of Others to our experience4 
for, insofar as we can only be (i.e., exist) as Being-in-the-world, we can only enter 
into a relation with Other Dasein on the basis of already being in a primordial 
relation of Mitsein (Being-with). The Dasein that is Being-in-the-world is not a 
“bare subject” for she shares “in advance” a world that is a With-world (Mitwelt). 
The sharing of a With-world thus implies that Being-in-the-world be Being(-in-the-
world)-with-Other-Dasein. 
1  Heidegger, (1967) p. 116; Heidegger (1962), 152.
2  Heidegger (1967), 110; Heidegger (1962), 144
3  Heidegger (1967), 118; Heidegger (1962), 153.
4  Heidegger (1967), 118; Heidegger (1962), 154.
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The existential condition, or as Heidegger will call it, the “basic constitution,”5 of 
Dasein (and Other Dasein) is the condition of Mitsein (Being-with) in a With-world. 
But this “mit” (“with”) is more than a mere preposition that precedes a noun; it is 
ontologically a pre-position, a given condition upon which every factical or ontic 
relation, every explicit physical relation or social institution, is founded. Far from 
being peripheral to the Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, Mitsein 
is nothing less than what Jean-Luc Nancy, not uncontroversially, calls the “first 
philosophy.”6 To ask the question of Being (Seinsfrage) is to ask the question of the 
Being of Dasein and so the question of Being that Dasein inquires into (or attempts 
to recover from its forgetfulness) is also the question of Being-with (Mitseinfrage). 
So not only is Mitsein a fundamental question for any ontological investigation 
(including Heidegger’s own in Being and Time) but it is also equiprimordial with 
the ontological question, the question of Being. Mit, it is clear, is not added onto 
Sein (Being) to ‘make’ Mitsein, but the Being of Dasein is Mitsein. 
Dasein, as Mitsein, is to be understood as a significant departure from the subject 
defined as an isolated individual essentially free from Others. Dasein “does not 
signify a what. This entity is not distinguished by its what, like a chair in contrast 
to a house. Rather, this designation in its own way expresses the way to be.”7 
If Dasein were merely a ‘what,’ something to be understood in its categorical 
distinction from all other things (such as the chair in contrast to the house), then 
Dasein would only be “with” Others when it was within the physical proximity of 
Others. Given this understanding, Dasein would be “with” Other Dasein when in 
a crowd but would be “without” Other Dasein when in solitude, as in the case of 
the hermit. As was suggested above, in the case of seeing Others through Things in 
our physical proximity, this might be how we tend to ontically, explicitly, and for the 
most part acknowledge the existence of Others (e.g. the hermit might notice that 
the wood that structures his house was bought from another person and therefore, 
as the resident of the house, notice that he is still in some relation with Others). 
But this does not speak to how Dasein is ontologically, in its authentic spatiality or 
relationality (i.e., non-categorical, not merely physically locative spatiality). 
 
To be “with” Other Dasein carries an “existential-ontological meaning” which 
confers the sense of Dasein as ontologically “with” Other Dasein even when 
factically alone. Aloneness is but a deficient mode of Being-with.8 This is to say 
that the absence of Other Dasein is merely an ontically deficient way in which 
Dasein is (always already) ontologically with Other Dasein. Dasein’s way to be is 
in relation, as ontologically Mitsein. But what, then, of Jemeinigkeit (Mineness)? Is 
5  Heidegger, (1985), 152.
6  Nancy, (1996) 55. For a discussion of Nancy’s relation to Heidegger’s ontology see 
Raffoul (1999), 36-52.
7  Heidegger, (1985), 153.
8  Heidegger (1967), 120; Heidegger (1962), 156.
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not this ‘to-be’ “in each instance mine?”9 Is this not where Dasein’s ontological 
condition of Mitsein, Dasein’s primordial relationality, becomes individuated and 
where, in the accusatory words of Karl Löwith, Heidegger’s depiction of Dasein 
shows itself as nothing more than “egocentrism and atomistic individualism”?10 
Is this not where Others are subjugated to a “solipsistic drive [that] characterizes 
being-in-the-world in terms of Dasein’s mineness?”11 Heidegger is none too happy 
to respond to this potential objection:
This relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein’s Being, already is. 
Of course it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of 
Being-with, often depends upon how far one’s own Dasein has understood itself at 
the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one’s essential Being 
with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself. And that is 
possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already is with Others.12 
To come into one’s own, that is, to understand one’s own Being and to be free 
for Being-towards-oneself is to understand oneself as Mitsein. Dasein is in each 
case, at each time, its own but, as the passage above obviously demonstrates, this 
ownness (mineness, Jemeinigkeit) cannot be reduced to an egotistical individualism 
that assumes relationality as something added on afterward. 
Later, in Being and Time, Heidegger will claim that resoluteness, i.e., Being-one’s-
self, understanding one’s personal authentic way-to-be transparently, is in fact a 
realization of itself as Mitsein:
Resoluteness, as an authentic Being-one’s self does not detach Dasein from its 
world, nor does it become a free-floating “I”…Resoluteness brings the self right 
into its own current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes 
it into solicitous Being-with-others.13  
To singularly (and thus authentically) understand oneself is to understand one’s own 
Being as ontologically plural, as “with.” Daseins’ “Being-in-themselves within-the-
world is Dasein-with (Mitdasein)”14 That being said, no longer can it be claimed 
9  Heidegger (1985) 153.
10  Karl Löwith quoted in Dallmayr (1980), 236. My contention in this paper is one which 
runs contrary to the conclusions Löwith makes on the topic of Mitsein in Löwith (1928), 
79-82. 
11  Gratton (2004), 33. Gratton is referring here to what he takes to be the type of critique 
Levinas has waged against Heidegger.
12  Heidegger (1967), 125; Heidegger (1962), 162; my italics.
13  Heidegger (1967), 298; Heidegger (1962), 344.
14  Heidegger (1967), 118; Heidegger (1962), 155.
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that Being and Time treats Mitsein cursorily or that a deep-rooted individualism 
overshadows the social and ethical (as well as political and institutional) significance 
of his account. The given, i.e., a priori, relationality of Mitsein makes the ability 
to even talk of Dasein’s ability to authentically ask the question of its own Being 
possible. It is this relationality that also underlies all ontic relationships (for instance, 
political power-structures, teacher-student relations, etc.) between two or more 
“subjects” physically ‘coming together’ (or ‘moving apart’). With Heidegger’s 
discussion of Mitsein, of ontological Being-with, we see the necessary ground for 
any discussion of institutional or socio-political praxis.
DeFICIeNt oR INDIFFeReNt SolICItUDe
Let us turn now to the way Heidegger conceives of these relations between 
Dasein and Other Dasein, relations he will call relations of solicitude. Solicitude 
[Fürsorge], like the concern [Besorge] we have for the ready-to-hand equipment in 
our world, is a comportment of Dasein towards the entities it encounters (including 
encountering them by taking notice of their physical absence). Likewise, it is 
through solicitude that Dasein can be encountered by the comportment of Other 
Dasein. Like our concern for equipment, it is an existentiale, a given constitutive 
condition of our Being-in-the-world. Just as there does not exist the possibility 
of Dasein being unconcerned (unbesorgt) with her environment (even if this 
concern is not explicit), so too must Dasein be understood as being in constant 
solicitude with Others.15 This commonality (along with the common root to both 
terms, Sorge, i.e., Care) should not be overlooked, but note must also be taken 
of the differences between solicitude and the concern for Things. Solicitude, as 
the comportment of Dasein to Other Dasein, carries the sense of caring-for (für) 
someone rather than the care one has about something. 
The intimacy of this (caring-for) relationality is founded upon Dasein’s ontological 
Being-with-Others. But this does not prevent Dasein from often and for the most 
part failing to embrace the intimacy of this situation. Instead, Dasein usually 
ignores its comportment and, when the occasion arises that it does attempt to 
understand its relation to Others, the ontological nature of this relation is usually 
obscured. When the hermit is aloof to the civilians of the nearby village, when he 
hides away, he usually does not understand himself to be in a relationship with 
Other Dasein that is much more intimate, albeit deficiently or indifferently, than 
the one he has with his tools. 
Aloofness [Zurückhaltung] and hiding away [Sichverstecken] 16 are but two of the 
many possible modes of indifferently and deficiently comporting oneself toward 
others, each one carrying with it a similar sense of ignoring the Mitsein that makes 
15  Heidegger (1967), 121; Heidegger (1962), 157-158.
16  Heidegger (1967), 124; Heidegger (1962), 161.
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it even possible to pass another by. Having the reality of our comportment toward 
Others disguised in this manner, we reject (or, if rejection carries too active a sense, 
we might say that this rejection is implicit in apathetically ignoring) our solicitude. 
Deficient solicitude is not acknowledged by the Dasein who is deficiently solicitous 
because deficient solicitude is characterized by a lack of recognition (a “passing 
by”) of its own solicitude as solicitude – and one cannot understand the deficiency 
of a comportment they do not recognize. It is obvious that if this everyday, deficient 
mode of solicitude were ignored by Dasein, then, so too would Dasein extend the 
same indifference to the very condition of its possibility, the condition of Mitsein. 
Because of our indifference to both our solicitous comportment and the condition 
of solicitude’s possibility, we are mistakenly inclined to exclude Mitsein from our 
understanding of our relation to Others. Of course, I, as Dasein, will be Mitsein 
“whether I know about it or not, whether I have lost myself [i.e., an understanding 
of myself as Mitsein]….or not,”17 but this indifference and deficiency, nevertheless, 
form the basis for many mistaken analyses of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. 
On such a basis (or, precisely because of the lack of an understanding of our 
true ontological basis), we have offered up theories of the self and its relation 
to Others, its relation to society, that exclude any account of given, ontological 
relationality altogether. With this exclusion the ontic conditions that encourage 
authentic solicitude (i.e., those that lead to emancipation through leaping-ahead, 
which we will address below) are diminished. Without an account of Mitsein, such 
theories most often characterize humans18 as isolated, self-sufficient selves, free 
of any necessary relationships. Any relationships between selves, on this account, 
are voluntarily entered into and are thereby optional. This atomistic account of 
our relations with one another carries with it some serious political consequences 
when institutions are shaped to reflect this naïve view.19 We will address the 
connection being made between deficient solicitude and misdirected institutional 
practices (specifically, how they effect pedagogical theories and practices) shortly. 
leaPINg-IN
Before discussing the practical consequences of deficient solicitude let us turn 
to Heidegger’s account of solicitude’s positive modes. Heidegger identifies two 
modes of positive solicitude, leaping-in [eineinspringen] and leaping-ahead 
[vorausspringen].20 When Dasein leaps-in for another, she (Dasein) takes care of 
17  Heidegger (1985), 153.
18  Using Heidegger’s term ‘Dasein’ would not fit with these theories as all sense of ‘there’ 
[da] is lost when one attempts to abstract from the condition of Being-in-the(-with)-
world.
19  Contrast Heidegger’s account of Mitsein, for example, with the idea of an atomistic self 
entering into relation with Others that is at the core of social contract theories. 
20  The designation of the term ‘positive’ is at first puzzling, for the two modes of positive 
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the Other’s concern. This requires Dasein to usurp the position of the Other in 
order to take on her tasks, whatever they might be, and become the one-caring: 
caring-for (Fürsorge) by becoming the one-caring. The original one-caring is then 
left without tasks (or at least without the tasks that pertain to those concerns that 
are taken over). The original proprietor of the concern might have this concern 
returned to her after it has been resolved (as a child might hand in and sign his 
name to an assignment that was, nevertheless, completed by someone else) or she 
might wash her hands of the concern altogether, completely giving it over to the 
one leaping-in.21  
The motivation for this leaping-in need not be malicious nor even self-centered. In 
fact, oftentimes motivation to leap-in for another comes from a source of kindness, 
a genuine effort to help by disburdening the Other. In order to illustrate what is 
meant here by leaping-in, we could use as an example the case of someone, say 
an anthropologist, earnestly wishing to understand certain cultural customs that 
are not her own. Any given practitioner of this custom might have reason(s) to fear 
the anthropologist’s attempt to understand her custom. This fear could arise from 
the anticipation of losing some exclusive claim on this custom (e.g. an influential 
book might push the custom to wider exposure and popularity and have it taken 
up by others), or having it be misunderstood, or for many other possible reasons. 
The main point here is that the anthropologist might attempt to disburden the 
Other from the object of the Other’s concern (the concern here is a concern with 
another attempting to understand one’s practices) through attempts to assuage the 
Other’s fears and denying claims of difference. In this manner, the anthropologist 
will have denied the Other the task of dealing with her own concerns in her 
own way. Surely, this could be tied to a desire to perfunctorily address the topic, 
write a book, and live a comfortable life without much care for the accuracy or 
comprehensiveness of the interpretation and thereby without much sensitivity to 
the Other’s desires and well-being. But just as likely, and probably (at least if we 
are to be optimistic) in most cases, it is the case that many anthropologists wish to 
be sensitive in their treatments of another’s custom, wish to open up an avenue 
of peaceful dialogue, and perhaps do a service for the Other (e.g., help her better 
understand her own practices, help her practices gain greater exposure in order to 
facilitate peace and respect, etc.). 
solicitude are quite different and, after assessing the respective results of each mode, 
one cannot fail to see the preferability of leaping-ahead to leaping-in. ‘Positive’ is not, 
then, to be seen merely as a value judgement but is intended to indicate some degree 
of awareness of relationality. Deficient or indifferent solicitude does not recognize 
relationality, whereas leaping-in, while not properly understanding the ontological 
conditions of relationality and thereby misdirecting its comportment exclusively to the 
concerns of the Other, at least recognizes some degree of relationality.  
21  Heidegger (1967), 122; Heidegger (1962), 158. 
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This is simply to say that it is often the case that one leaps-in for another with the 
best of intentions and to counter the negative ethical implications of deficient 
solicitude (e.g., passing the Other by, being inconsiderate, being reserved, etc). But 
leaping-in leads one toward the opposite extremity, the overhasty identification of 
oneself with another’s concern. For precisely these reasons it is often the case that 
the one leaping-in for another does not realize that they are actually depriving the 
Other of her concerns and leaving the Other dependent upon the one leaping-in. 
As a dependent or as a victim of oppression, however subtle the form, the one 
‘helped’ becomes dominated – this is nothing less than ‘help’ as a subtle form of 
colonization. The terms of the Other’s concern often are changed so significantly 
through the intervention that, if given the chance to take up her former concerns 
again, the Other is partially or fully dependent on further intervention (help with 
adapting, training, etc.). Leaping-in becomes what Fred Dallmayr calls “managerial 
solicitude;” the Other becomes managed and not genuinely helped.22 It matters 
‘who’ deals with the concern and not just that it gets dealt with and this is precisely 
what is lost when the Other is managed in this fashion. A great deal has been written 
on the domination and dependence that comes as a result of well-intentioned 
leaping in – take for example the ever-expanding critical literature on the topic of 
Orientalism, on the idea of a “White Man’s Burden,” on the attempt to introduce 
liberalism through interventionist wars, and so on and so on. 
Not all domination, or management, of this kind is explicit or recognized, by either 
the Dasein who is leaping-in or the Other Dasein who has been leapt-in for. A 
similar case, but of a more generalized variety23 is when the public, the “They” – 
who is no one in particular and, therefore, precisely anyone, any One [das Man], 
meant in the way we say “one could do that,” meaning nobody in particular – 
leaps-in for Dasein and hands her a pre-interpreted (impersonal) interpretation. 
Here, Dasein is disburdened of the need to take on the task of interpretation, to 
come to her own conclusions and understands herself no further than as a “They”-
self. Conformity takes the place of a personalized, authentic understanding. In 
such cases, Dasein is often tricked into believing herself to have arrived at this 
dominant interpretation on her own, having worked through her task by herself, 
having taken up her own questions and concerns. 
22  Dallmayr (1980), 242.
23  Since the “They” cannot be identified as a particular Dasein or a particular group or, in 
fact, anything particular – since their name itself, Das Man (the One), carries a neutral, 
unspecific meaning – this example is a generalized account of leaping-in meant to draw 
out the effects leaping-in can have. That is to say that, unlike our discussion of Dasein 
leaping-in for another, we are not here suggesting that the “They” can have a mode of 
solicitude (as if it could be individuated in such a manner), but rather that being leapt-in 
for makes one vulnerable to dominance, including the dominance of the “They” (i.e., 
it prevents authentic existentiell modifications of the They). For Heidegger’s account of 
the “They” in relation to authenticity see §27 of Being and Time.    
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Dasein is prevented from taking on her concerns on her own because leaping-in 
overlooks what is best for Dasein; leaping-in overlooks the Other’s existence and 
the other’s freedom to take up concerns on her own. Though the one leaping-in 
believes herself to be an aid, the act of leaping-in focuses on the concerns of the 
Other at the expense of any focus on the Other herself, her possibilities, and her 
ability to resolve her concerns. Leaping-in concerns itself with ‘what’ the concern 
is about, those things ready-to-hand, and not ‘who’ has the concern, i.e., Other 
Dasein. So, although different than deficient or indifferent solicitude, leaping-
in, in a way, also bypasses Other Dasein by directing its comportment toward 
the concern of the Other. This bypassing is not as extreme as it is in the case of 
deficient solicitude but it still misses the mark of authentically Being-with-Others. 
leaPINg-aHeaD
Instead of taking over the concern of the Other, leaping-ahead, as the other mode 
of positive solicitude, is a comportment of Dasein toward another in such a way 
that will facilitate the Other in the taking up of their concern by themselves. This 
is the same as saying that Dasein, through leaping-ahead, considers the conditions 
necessary for the taking up of one’s concern24 and, without directing all attention 
to the task itself, does what is possible to give the Other the freedom to do so 
authentically. Although the issue of authenticity and its relation to the “They” 
concerns §27 more than it does §26, the focus of our discussion, it will suffice for 
our purposes to suggest that authenticity is a coming into one’s own, an embracing 
of the freedom to take up one’s concerns. But this is a equally a freedom that 
results in an awareness that in the midst of such concerns one is not radically 
isolated (as deficient solicitude had imagined it) but is ontologically Mitsein. This 
recognition of oneself as Mitsein is what it means to understand the Being of 
Dasein, to become transparent to oneself.25 
This authenticity is the result of Dasein dealing with her concerns on her own and 
the greatest of these is the concern for her own Being.26 Ontologically, Dasein’s 
Being is Mitsein, so to take up the freedom to become authentic, to take up 
one’s concerns, is, for Dasein, inseparable from taking up the question of one’s 
own Being, recognizing and inquiring into the question of one’s Mitsein. So, this 
inquiring into our condition, this attempt at recovering the question of our own 
Being, shows Dasein’s authentic individuality to be one always already related to 
Others. To come into one’s own singularly is to recognize oneself as related in a 
24  Relating this to education, Kant makes a similar point in Kant (2003), 19, where 
he emphasizes discretion in education (the necessary discretion of the teacher, the 
one leaping-ahead, for the purpose of teaching students the discretion necessary to 
personally choose the ends which are good).
25  Heidegger (1967), 125; Heidegger (1962), 162.
26  Heidegger (1967), 122; Heidegger (1962), 159.
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plurality, in a primordial relationality. Emancipation, freedom, empowerment – 
whatever term we might use to describe the ability to take up the question of our 
Being –, when conceived authentically, is not a freedom from Others and vastly 
differs from deficient solicitude’s conception of what it might mean to be free. 
The freedom given by leaping-ahead for another is reconceived, apart from any 
voluntaristic sense, as emancipation from the misunderstanding of Dasein’s Being. 
This freedom is a breaking out of the enslavement that came with the ignorance 
and radical atomism of deficient solicitude and the enslavement that came with 
the dominance of leaping-in. 
To have the question of my Being recovered from forgetfulness, and to be freed 
to inquire into it, often requires one leap-ahead of you; it often requires someone 
with an understanding of the ontological condition of Mitsein to actively enable 
you to inquire into the question of your own Being. As Miguel de Beistegui puts it, 
“to have the appropriate relation to the other is to comport oneself in such a way 
that the existence of the other becomes an issue for the other.”27 If one has asked 
the question of one’s own Being, has attempted to understand Dasein as Mitsein, 
then one is better prepared to consider the conditions necessary for the Other 
understanding her own Being. Or, in Heidegger’s words, “he who truly knows 
what is, knows what he wills in the midst of what is.”28 An understanding of our 
ontological situation aids the possibility of comprehensive, ethical comportment. 
To know one’s place in the world, what one is to will “in the midst of what is,” is 
to know how to act appropriately and respond to the demands of the situation 
(in this case, how to facilitate another’s understanding of her own Being). Both 
deficient solicitude and leaping-in were insufficient in this sense due to their 
improper orientation to our ontological condition.  
Leaping-in can be seen as a failed attempt to leap ahead. The failure of this 
attempt originates from a failure to understand the ramifications and possibilities 
of Dasein as Mitsein, of sharing a With-world with Other Dasein. By improperly 
understanding these possibilities, leaping-in targets the actual conditions without 
considering Other Dasein’s possibilities (i.e., the possibility to understand herself 
as Mitsein, the possibility to leap-ahead of Others, etc.), thereby preventing Other 
Dasein the possibility of potential authenticity. Given the possibility of authentically 
having one’s condition become transparent to oneself, it would follow that Dasein 
would be led to take up leaping-ahead in her own solicitude toward Others. As 
Heidegger says, “In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality 
of involvements, one must have disclosed already that for which [woraufhin] 
they have been freed.”29 The success of any ontic action or practical resolution 
will depend on how far we have come in attempting to recover the ontological 
27  De Beistegui (1990) 147, as quoted in Shapiro (1994), 407.
28  Heidegger (1951), 55.
29  Heidegger (1967),  85; Heidegger (1962), 118.
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question, how far we have attempted to understand the question of our very 
existence.  
As the possibility of leaping-ahead demonstrates, we are not forced to choose 
between what John Dewey calls “Either-Or philosophies,”30 between relationality 
that is necessarily inauthentic on the one hand or authenticity that is individualistic, 
on the other. We interpreted the solicitude of leaping-in as leaving the Other socially 
anonymous, dependent, dominated, and vulnerable to the inauthentic conformity 
of the “They.” Our understanding of relationality or community is inauthentic 
under these conditions. We read deficient or indifferent solicitude as the attempt 
to overcome or bypass all types of relationality or community and assert oneself 
on one’s own as independent of Others. Against some commentators, who have 
made use of this wrongheaded dichotomy for the purposes of depicting Heidegger 
as either a radical individualist, an autocrat, or as offering a contradictory account 
of solicitude, we have tried to account for leaping-ahead as an alternative, as 
an authentic way of enabling another to take up her own concerns and thereby 
recognize her own ontological condition as Mitsein. 
Insofar as leaping-ahead involves a consideration of the conditions that would 
enable one to take up her own concern and become authentic, these conditions, 
these “prevailing factical social arrangements,”31 play a role in the prevention or 
facilitation of leaping-ahead and thereby prevent or facilitate an understanding of 
our ontological condition. Many factical social arrangements, for example, enforce 
the reduction of ourselves and others to our objects of concern or treat us as if 
we were only optionally related to one another. Those arrangements that direct 
themselves toward Dasein’s concerns rather than with Dasein herself often tend 
to enforce the bureaucratization, commodification, and uniformization of social 
life.32 Those arrangements that treat our relations as optional or insignificant tend 
to enforce radical divisions of labour, compartmentalism, and the erosion of the 
very idea of social life. Thus, the conditions that leaping-ahead must consider 
and maneuver its way between are often political and institutional. There is often 
a material aspect to solicitude, as is apparent in Heidegger’s own discussion of 
solicitude sometimes taking the form of offering food, clothing, and medicine.33 
So, how might we recognize what is needed, including material needs? What type 
of social institution would facilitate this type of leaping-ahead? To address this 
concern, we turn to a consideration of one of these institutions, the institution of 
education and the relation between solicitude and pedagogy. 
30  Dewey (1997), 20.
31  Heidegger (1967), 121; Heidegger (1962), 158.
32  A discussion of these types of arrangements can be found in Shapiro (1994), 414.
33  Heidegger (1967), 121; Heidegger (1962), 158. 
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eDUCatIoN
In Dewey’s book Experience and Education we are given an analysis of two 
different models of American education with drastically different methodologies. 
Both approaches are rooted in a particular understanding of how the student might 
benefit from teaching practices and, therefore, both assume what is best for the 
student by appealing to some understanding of who the student is. This is to say, in 
a Heideggerian fashion, that the methodologies applied to educational practices 
assume some understanding of Dasein and the pertinence of their practices are 
thereby going to depend on the degree to which they properly understand the 
conditions of Dasein’s Being. Both of these models, it shall be argued, are guilty 
of misunderstanding or ignoring those ontological conditions that determine who 
Dasein is and thereby lead to inauthentic pedagogical relationships. 
Dewey names the two approaches the “traditional” school and the “progressive” 
school.34 The traditional school directs its attention to the subject-matter of 
education, which it for the most part views as particular information and skills that 
have been worked out in the past and been turned into effective, transmittable rules 
and habits.35 As Louis Althusser writes, this traditional “function of teaching is to 
transmit a determinate knowledge to subjects who do not possess this knowledge. 
The teaching situation thus rests on the absolute condition of an inequality between 
a knowledge and a nonknowledge.”36 The teacher, believing the student to be 
lacking knowledge and therefore incapable of having a significant part in dealing 
with her own concern (to educate themselves), leaps-in for the student by handing 
them a commodified package of knowledge to be memorized. Because the nature 
of this knowledge is claimed to be static, students are often discouraged from 
personalizing their understanding of the material and are prevented from going 
further than merely adopting an interpretation handed to them by a bureaucratic 
board of education informed by the traditions of the public (viz. the dictatorship of 
the “They”).  Receptivity, docility, and obedience are stressed37 over any personal 
inquiry into the conditions of one’s own (educational) experience. Dewey, 
following the American Transcendentalists, believes this “Lockean “sensualism” 
that [depicts] persons as surfaces on which an educator might imprint a world” 
to be insufficient.38 But, as we saw with the subtle forms of colonialism present 
in the leaping-in of anthropologists, so, too, will “good teachers…use devices of 
34  Dewey is careful to note that the term “progressive” is not meant to imply a superior 
standing between the two schools in Dewey (1997), 17.
35  Ibid..
36  Althusser (1964), 152, translated in Rancière (1991), xvi.
37  Dewey (1997), 18.
38  Anderson (2006), 170. 
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art to cover up the imposition so as to relieve it of obviously brutal features.”39 
Overbearing paternalism often legitimizes itself under the rhetoric of aid, 
protection, and rigour. 
Traditional education’s strength lies in its acknowledgement of what Dewey calls 
the “objective conditions” of experience,40 those social relations which contribute 
to a student’s education, such as a teacher’s instruction. But the relationality that 
it does recognize is insufficiently robust insofar as this relationality is one propped 
by imposition. Dewey warns against the implementation of certain teaching 
tactics (those involving coercion, dependency, etc.) that prevent the experiences 
necessary for a student to grow, to develop, to come to his own understanding. 
Such tactics often overlook what Dewey calls the “subjective” component of a 
student’s concerns;41 they overlook Dasein for her concerns. The victims of 
interventionism often seek refuge in some form of isolationism, something evident 
in the rise of the progressive school.
There is a danger, as Dewey notes, in only developing principles in reaction to 
another school,42 as in the case with the progressive school, which might be better 
defined as the “anti-traditional” school. A mere “departure from the old solves no 
problems.”43 To tie this approach to our discussion of solicitude, we might note that 
deficient solicitude, insofar as it does not recognize solicitude with Others, rejects 
the interventionism of leaping-in. Deficient solicitude, of course, depends on a 
primordial “with” just as progressive education depends on the social significance 
of history, tradition, community, etc. However, unaware of the debt to this 
“with,” unaware of the social embeddedness that underscores its very existence, 
progressive education stresses only what it takes to be the radically individualistic 
desires and impulses of a subject. Without an account of the subject’s (or Dasein’s) 
Being-in-the(-with)-World), it sees the apparent spontaneity of these impulses 
as completely free of “objective conditions.” In terms of solicitude, excessive 
individualism ignores both ontic solicitude and its ontological conditions (Mitsein), 
taking each “subject” to be nothing more than a ‘what’ categorically distinguished 
from another ‘what.’ 
Progressive education’s goal is to provide students a certain freedom, but this 
freedom is negatively construed as freedom from social bonds, freedom from 
Others. This is a deceptive freedom44 and models based on this deception can 
become as dogmatic as those based on top-down autocratic models of relationality 
39  Dewey (1997), 19.
40  Ibid., 45.
41  Ibid., 38.
42  Ibid., 20.
43  Ibid., 25.
44  Ibid., 10.
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(i.e., traditional education).45 Freedom understood in this limited way characterizes 
all social bonds as optional and modes of infringement. But, as Dewey writes, the 
experience necessary for education, for a sense of personal freedom, “does not 
occur in a vacuum,”46 a fact which would become evident if progressive education 
were to examine the conditions of its very existence, its underlying “principles.”47 
It is the responsibility of the educator to inquire into these underlying conditions 
to assess the educational tools and methods she will use in teaching. Such an 
inquiry will include an examination into the Being of the teacher and her students, 
into the Being of Dasein and thus into Mitsein. Such an investigation will open 
up the possibilities of inquiring into the role of the teacher, into the role of texts, 
into “freedom [and what it will] mean and [into] the conditions under which it is 
capable of realization.”48  Under such an investigation it will become apparent 
that the freedom of “enduring importance is…freedom of observation and of 
judgement”49 which, under a Heideggerian reading, we can interpret as the 
personal freedom to inquire into one’s own ontological constitution, one’s own 
Being as Mitsein. 
We find in Dewey’s “directed freedom,”50 a notion of freedom that mirrors 
Heidegger’s account of emancipatory solicitude (leaping-ahead), both the 
necessity of personal freedom and an understanding of our relation to Others. 
Leaping-ahead recognizes that the conditions that foster another to wrestle with 
her concerns, that foster an education, must neither be imposed, unenjoyable, 
repetitive rehearsals, nor shall they be, in the fashion of libertarian accounts 
of freedom, dismissed altogether.51 “Education can only exist in this struggle of 
offering something on the one hand, but keeping [Dasein’s] possibilities open on 
the other.”52 The educator must carefully assess our proximal, ontic conditions for 
their experiential possibilities, their place on what Dewey calls the “experiential 
continuum,”53 in order to assess their fittingness not just for experience and freedom, 
but for the proper types of experience and freedom. The proper experiences, the 
proper types of freedom, will be those which take Dasein herself, not just Dasein’s 
concerns, into account. “Under these conditions,” the educator must ask, “will my 
students realize on their own that their personal experiences are, in fact, social?” 
45  Ibid., 22.
46  Ibid., 40.
47  Ibid., 22.
48  Ibid., 22.
49  Ibid., 61. 
50  Anderson (2006), 171.
51  Dewey (1997), 27.
52  Smeyers (2002), 97. 
53  Dewey (1997), 33.
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It is imperative that the teacher who leaps-ahead continually look for opportunities 
that will provide experiences that accomplish this and this is a task that is rarely 
obvious or risk-free for, unlike traditional education, leaping-ahead has no preset 
form to disperse to each student.54 When the teacher undertakes this risk and is 
no longer preoccupied with preset standards of instrumental transmission (with 
leaping-in to take away the students concerns), she no longer acts in the manner 
of a dictator. The teacher-student relationship, based on this leaping-ahead, is 
able to offer an authentic freedom to “retrieve a way of relating to things which 
is fundamental to human consciousness as a whole…. An initiation into what it 
is to be human in some founding sense.”55 Based on leaping-ahead, the teacher-
student relationship is, contra leaping-in, no longer a managerial tool but, contra 
deficient solicitude, still recognizes itself as a relationship. 
The combination of Dewey’s account of how we might overcome the 
shortcomings of both traditional and progressive education with Heidegger’s 
account of emancipatory solicitude has shed light on “how we become what we 
are.”56  We have attempted to account for the irreducibly central position Mitsein 
plays in understanding both the ontological conditions and ontic possibilities of 
Dasein. On this basis, a description of the possible modes of Dasein’s solicitude 
and their implications for how we understand our relationships with Others has 
been possible. Finally, having suggested that each mode of solicitude has as its 
institutional counterpart a certain model of the teacher-student relationship, we 
were able to offer the grounds to practically assess certain pedagogical practices. 
In suggesting that pedagogical practice move toward the aims of leaping-ahead we 
can conclude that a mature approach to education will strive to take up the task of 
freeing students for authentically making sense of their own existential-ontological 
condition. 
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